and the proper role of courts in a constitutional system. He also perceives a significant risk that an internationalist approach to constitutional adjudication could result in undermining rather than enhancing the American approach to constitutional rights. MichaelD. Ramsey continues the critique by calling for those who would apply international sources to accept rigorous discipline in their use, involving (1) articulation of the theory of relevance of such materials; (2) acceptance of outcomes that might not necessarily support the rights-enhancing preferences of most internationalists; (3) attention to the full factual picture of international practice; and (4) avoidance of the uncritical assumption that the views of selected human rights tribunals and UN agencies represent a global consensus.
Gerald L. Neuman offers both ajustification for turning to international law and practice as one available resource for constitutional interpretation, and a method for how to do so. He analyzes the relationship between international human fights law and constitutional interpretation in terms of their consensual, suprapositive, and institutional characteristics, so that a serious inquiry into international sources can inform a domestic court as it strives for the most complete understanding of complex problems that recur in democratic societies around the world. Finally, T. Alexander Aleinikoff seeks to move beyond the existing debates on the place of international law in theU.S. legal system, by advocating congressional enactment of a new "Incompatibility Statute" modeled on the British Human Rights Act, which would allow forjudicial determinations of inconsistencies between U.S. federal law and international law and facilitate efforts to ensure compliance with the international obligations of the United States.
Our hope is that the viewpoints expressed in this forum not only will contribute to the ongoing dialogue in this country about the relevance of international sources to domestic legal questions, but also will help our foreign readership reach a fuller understanding of the complex interactions of international law and constitutional law in the United States.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PART OF OUR LAW

By Harold Hongu Koh*
What did the United States Supreme Court mean when it famously said, "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriatejurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination"?' Perhaps the Courtwas suggesting that, in an interdependent world,
We are aware that we will be serving the interests of our people only if we honour our international commitments by signing the relevant conventions and treaties which not only safeguard our sovereignty and our interests but also respect the sovereignty and interests of other peoples and States, particularly those of our region. 5 SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 111 introductory note (1987) ("From the beginning, the law of nations, later referred to as international law, was considered to be incorporated into the law of the United States without the need for any action by Congress or the President, and the courts, State and federal, have applied it and given it effect as the courts of England had done.") ( Eleven years later, he clarified that absent a contrary statute, "the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land."' In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall suggested that mankind's views are also relevant to the task of constitutional interpretation, noting:
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this--that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action....
... In considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.") Significantly, at the beginning of the Republic, U.S. courts drew no sharp line between international and foreign law, precisely because of the extensive overlap of these two bodies of law. Customary rules like lex mercatoria and the criminal prohibition against piracies and felonies on the high seas were both "international," in the sense of governing transboundary transactions, and "foreign," in the sense of being internalized into the domestic law of foreign legal systems, as well as that of the United States." It was thus often difficult to distinguish when American courts were treating "international" or "foreign" law as part of our law. Some rules were inherently "transnational," hence not easily categorized as local or global in nature.
From the beginning, then, American courts regularly tookjudicial notice of both international law and foreign law (the law and practice of other nations) when construing American law. Given this historical tradition, should United States constitutional interpretation now ignore international law standards and the practices of other countries? Remarkably, some offer reasons why it should. 2 But such an approach would constitute a stunning reversal of history. When is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to construe our Constitution in light of foreign and international law? History suggests that over the years, the Court has regularly looked to foreign and international precedents as an aid to constitutional interpretation in at least three situations, which for simplicity's sake I will call "parallel rules," "empirical light," and "community standard." First, the Court has noted when American legal rules seem to parallel those of other nations, particularly those with similar legal and social traditions." As the Court has repeatedly recognized, the concept of "ordered liberty" is not uniquely American but, rather, is "enshrined" in the legal history of "English-speaking peoples," as well as other legal systems. Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations, and there may be relevant political and structural differences between their systems and our own.... But their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem-in this case the problem of reconciling central authority with the need topreserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller constituent governmental entity.'
Third, in addition to situations involving parallel rules and empirical lessons, the Court has looked outside the United States when a U.S. constitutional concept, by its own terms, implicitly refers to a community standard-e.g., "cruel and unusual" "dueprocess of law," "unreasonablesearches and seizures." In such cases, the Court has long since recognized that the relevant communities to be consulted include those outside our shores. For example, in deciding whether a particular punishment has become both "cruel and unusual," the Court has long taken notice of foreign and international practice to evaluate how "unusual" the practice has become.' 7 In Trop v. Dulles, the Court specifically held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution contains "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 8 In Tropand subsequent cases, the Court made clear that this "evolving standard" should be measured by reference notjust to maturing American experience, but to foreign and international experience as well.
In Coker v. Georgia,'" for example, the Court determined that international practices regarding the death penalty for rape were relevant to its "evolving standards" analysis. Five years later, in Enmund v. Florida, the Court noted that "the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe." ' In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 2 ' following the reasoning of Trop,JusticeJohn Paul Stevens's plurality opinion invalidated the death penalty for fifteen-year-old offenders, evaluating the Eighth Amendment's "civilized standards of decency" in part by looking to the prohibition of the execution of minors by the Soviet Union and nations of Western Europe. 22 In addition, both the plurality and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concurrence found significant that three major international human of decency and fairness which express the notions ofjustice of English-speaking peoples"); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366 (1916) (observing that the Constitution embodies "only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities"). Happily, over time, the Court has relaxed its "Anglophonia" and spoken more broadly about "civilized societies," without regard to the particular language they mayspeak. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,409 (1986) (noting"the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity") (emphasis added But given the foregoing historyJustice Scalia erred in at least four ways. First, that history should have led ajustice devoted to originalism to look, like the framers themselves, toward-not away from-international opinion. Second, far from "imposing" the views of other nations on Americans, an originalist reading of the Eighth Amendment would have acknowledged that the views of other nations were not imposed on earlyAmericans; rather, Americans selfconsciously appealed to those views in order to win global legitimacy for their fledgling republic. Third, on reflection, it makes little constitutional sense for our Supreme Court to decide these cases in a vacuum. The United States has never been a hermetically sealed legal system. It shares a common legal heritage, tradition, and history with many foreign constitutional systems. For that reason, constitutional concepts like "liberty," "equal protection," "due process of law," and privacy have never been exclusive U.S. property, but have long carried global meaning. 25 To construe these terms in ignorance of these foreign and international precedents virtually ensures that our Supreme Court rulings will generate conflict and controversies with our closest global allies. Conversely, to construe these terms in light of foreign interpretations allows the United States to use the experience of other nations that share its common constitutional genealogy as laboratories to test workable social solutions to common constitutional problems.
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Fourth and finally, Justice Scalia himself has been far from consistent in insisting upon the irrelevance of foreign and international law. Depending upon the factual setting, he has not hesitated to take foreign practice into account or to argue in favor of construing U.S. law consistently with principles of international law. 27 Nevertheless, one year after ThompsonJustice Scalia narrowly carried the day in Stanford v. Kentucky, when a 5-4 majority of the Court held that, notwithstanding international opinion, the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution ofjuvenile offenders who committed their crimes at age sixteen. 2 persons with mental retardation would offend civilized standards of decency, in part because "within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." 3 4 Only a few months later, in Patterson v. TexasJustices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented from denial of certiorari in a case challenging Texas's execution of ajuvenile offender, noting that "the issue has been the subject of further debate and discussion both in this country and in other civilized nations," which had produced an "apparent consensus ... among the States and in the international community against the execution of a capital sentence imposed on ajuvenile offender."
35 Similarly, when the petitioner in the 1989 Stanford case-still on death row after twenty yearspetitioned the Supreme Court for an original writ of habeas corpus, citing Atkins, Justices Stevens, David Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer all dissented from the Court's denial of the petition." On the same day,Justice Breyer separately dissented from a denial of certiorari, arguing that Atkins's consideration of foreign law required reexamination ofwhether prolonged incarceration on death row constituted cruel and unusual punishment per se.
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Writing soon thereafter, one commentator tried to dismiss this trend, noting that "Atkins presented the Supreme Court with an invitation to begin the process of internalizing global norms against the death penalty, and give 'new energy to "vertical" efforts to internalize international law norms into domestic constitutional law.' But the Supreme Court declined the invitation."' But no one could say the same after this past year's Supreme Court Term, when the relevance of foreign and international law to constitutional interpretation arose during the Term's two most publicized cases. During oral argument in the Michigan affirmative action cases, Justice Ginsburg asked the solicitor general:
[W] e're part of a world, and this problem is a global problem. Other countries operating under the same equality norm have confronted it. Our neighbor to the north, Canada, has, the European Union, South Africa, and they have all approved this kind of, they call it positive discrimination.... [T] hey have rejected what you recited as the ills that follow from this. Should we shut that from our view at all or should we consider whatjudges in other places have said on this subject? lower court in Lawrence had also invoked foreign comparisons. The Supreme Court simply used foreign legal evidence to challenge assumptions that the lower court had accepted without analysis. For example, to justify its ruling upholding the Texas sodomy statute, the Texas Court of Appeals had cited ancient Roman law, Blackstone, and Montesquieu to support the claim that "Western civilization has a long history of repressing homosexual behavior by state action.""' Yet incredibly, in making that assertion, the court took no notice of any judicial decision from any modern Western civilization, when all of Europe, for example, had for more than two decades taken the opposite view. Similarly, in Bowers, Chief Justice Warren Burger had claimed in concurrence that " [t] o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching, " " oblivious to the fact that, six years earlier, the European Court had already cast that teaching aside for what are now more than 800 million citizens of forty-five member states of the Council of Europe! After Grutterand Lawrence, what can now be said about the role of foreign and international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation? One obvious question is whether and how extensively the Court will apply its method in Lawrence to other constitutional contexts, particularly the death penalty. Only weeks after Lawrence was decided, one federal district judge cited it, together with Atkins, to question whether the federal death penalty can be reconciled with the constitutional barrier against executing persons who are actually innocent. 5 " In particular, the Lawrence approach clearly now runs on a collision course with America's continuing penchant for executingjuvenile offenders.
In 1979 representatives of the U.S. Department of State represented to Congress thatjuvenile execution was no longer a practice engaged in by the United States.
54 But a year after invalidating capital punishment for fifteen-year-olds in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court in Stanford v. Kentuckyarbitrarily concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the execution of sixteen-year-old juvenile offenders. When the rest of the nations of the world ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child-which only the United States and Somalia have declined to do-they committed themselves to banning executions of offenders under the age of eighteen. It thus became inevitable that the United States would soon stand virtually alone in openly executing juvenile offenders.
As expected, since 1989 the United States has carried out more publicly reported executions ofjuvenile offenders than any other country. In 1999 the only country besides the United States to admit to executing ajuvenile offender was Iran. 55 As abolition of the death penalty has become a cornerstone of European human rights policy, central and eastern European countries that aspire to enter the European political and economic system have increasingly calculated that the benefits ofjoining that system far exceed any benefits that might inure from the occasional use of the death penalty against juveniles. 56 the United States. 57 Of these, "[t]he only country that openly continues to execute child offenders within the framework of its regular criminaijustice system is the USA."" 8 Five of the last seven juvenile offenders executed worldwide have been executed in the United States.
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Even within the United States, executions of child offenders since 1977 have been carried out in just seven states, over two thirds of them in Texas and Virginia. Given these facts, any commonsense understanding of a ban against "cruel and unusual punishments" should now include a practice deemed notjust unusual, but illegal by all but five countries in the world and all but a few states even in this country. Weighing foreign and international opinion into any evaluation of evolving standards of decency among civilized nations leads inexorably to the conclusion that killing child offenders now violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Indeed, that was the conclusion of the Missouri Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, a case that will be heard by the United States Supreme Court early in the 2004-2005 Term. 6 0 More fundamentally, the last Supreme Court Term confirms that two distinct approaches now uncomfortably coexist within our own Supreme Court's globaljurisprudence. 6 1 The first is a "nationalistjurisprudence," exemplified by the opinions ofJustices Scalia and Clarence Thomas. 62 Thatjurisprudence is characterized by commitments to territoriality, extreme deference to national executive power and political institutions, and resistance to comity or international law as meaningful constraints on national prerogatives. This line of cases largely refuses to look beyond U.S. national interests when assessing the legality of extraterritorial action. Moreover, these decisions have largely rejected international comity as a reason unilaterally to restrain the scope of U.S. regulation, 6 3 and dismiss treaty or customary international law rules as meaningful restraints upon U.S. action.' To deal with perceived exigencies, these rulings have broadly deferred to federal executive power, largely unchecked byjudicial oversight, "clear statement" principles, or claims of individual rights. 65 When advised of foreign legal precedents, these decisions have treated them as irrelevant, or worse yet, an impermissible imposition on the exercise of American sovereignty.
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A second, more venerable strand of "transnationalistjurisprudence," now being carried forward byJustices Breyer and Ginsburg, 6 7 began with Chief'Justice (and former congressional secretary for foreign affairs) John Jay and Chief'Justice (and former secretary of state) Marshall, 57 AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 55. Unlike nationalistjurisprudence, which rejects foreign and international precedents and looks for guidance primarily to national territory, political institutions, and executive power, the transnationalistj urisprudence assumes America's political and economic interdependence with other nations operating within the international legal system. Nor, significantly, do these Justices distinguish sharply between the relevance of foreign and international law, recognizing that one prominent feature of a globalizing world is the emergence of a transnational law, particularly in the area of human rights, that merges the national and the international.
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Addressing the American Society of International Law,Justice O'Connor noted that, increasingly, foreign and international law issues are coming before U.S. courts "because international law is no longer confined in relevance to a few treaties and business agreements. In such a transnationalist system, asJustice Breyer has noted, understanding and making reference to foreign constitutional precedents aids U.S. constitutional interpretation, "simply because of the enormous value in any discipline of trying to learn from the similar experience of others." 77 Under this view, domestic courts must play a key role in coordinating U.S. domestic constitutional rules with rules of foreign and international law, not simply to promote American aims, but to advance the broader development of a well-functioning international s " Construing U.S. constitutional law by referring to other nations' constitutional drafters, but not their constitutional interpreters, would be akin to operating a building by examining the blueprints of others on which it was modeled, while ignoring all subsequent progress reports on howwell those other buildings actually functioned over time. 2 In Lawrence itself, justice Scalia argued that Bowers "never relied on 'values we share with a wider civilization,'.... but rather rejected the claimed right to sodomy on the ground that such a right was not "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' " 3 Hejustified Bowers in part because "sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of Rights." 8 4 But to state the argument that way is to refute it. For, asJustice Scalia earlier conceded, "[t] he Court is quite right that 'history and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.' "85 Early American law punished notjust consensual sodomy, but also idolatry, blasphemy, adultery, and witchcraft, all of which were treated as capital crimes. 8 6 In looking to foreign law, the Lawrence Court simply made two obvious comparisons: first, that the right asserted by petitioners had long been accepted as fundamental in other countries; and second, that the State of Texas had demonstrated no more compelling, "legitimate or urgent" state interest in restricting that right than had been demonstrated in any of these sister countries. 8 7 What sense does it make to construe evolving, universally recognized constitutional concepts such as "due process" and privacy solely in light of national historical tradition, all legal systems identify one or more mechanisms through which executive, legislative, and judicial institutions may domesticate international norms, with judicial interpretation of domestic constitutions representing only one such channel. 93 Through a time-honored dialogic process, litigants, activists, publicists, and academic commentators seek to inform, influence, and improve this kind ofjudicial decision making. There is nothing antidemocratic about academics, nongovernmental organizations,judges, executive officials, Congress, and foreign governments interacting in a variety of private and public, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, internalize, and ultimately enforce rules of transnational law. To the contrary, it is precisely through this transnational legal process that interlinked rules of domestic and international law develop, and that interlinked processes of domestic and international compliance come about.
In this transnational legal process, the several states, foreign governments, and international bodies do not represent competing sovereigns, all vying for the right to control America'sjudicial destiny. Rather, a transnationalistjurisprudence suggests, the United States expresses its national sovereignty not by blocking out all foreign influence but by vigorous "participation in the various regimes that regulate and order the international system." 94 The nationalists' suggestion that U.S. courts should disregard the rest of the civilized world by ignoring parallel foreign precedents only invites charges of parochialism, and undermines U.S. influence over the global development of human rights. Nationalist academics charge that American human rights advocates have used international and foreign legal materials selectively; in one commentator's words, refusing to "take the bitter with the sweet," 95 or in another's view, proposing "international sources ... for comparison only if they are viewed as rights enhancing." 9 6 Bizarrely, these scholars assume that United Statesjudges should construe a national bill of rights that the framers thought was the model for the world in light of the world's worst practices. What this claim misunderstands is that those who advocate the use of international and foreign sources in U.S. constitutional interpretation are not urging U.S. courts to defer automatically to some kind of global "nose count." Instead, they are suggesting that the practices of other mature democracies-not those that lag behind developmentally-constitute the most relevant evidence of what Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence calls the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
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My point is simple: those who advocate the use of international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation are not mere "international majoritarians" who believe thatAmerican constitutional liberties should be determined by a worldwide vote. Rather, transnationalists suggest that particular provisions of our Constitution should be construed with decent respect for international and foreign comparative law. When phrases like "due process of law," "equal protection," and "cruel and unusual punishments" are illuminated by parallel rules, empirical evidence, or community standards found in other mature legal systems, that evidence should not simply be ignored. Wise American judges did not do so at the beginning of the Republic, and there is no warrant for them to start now.
In any event, Lautrence and Atkins may signal that the nationalists' heyday has finally passed. AsJustice Breyer recently noted, "By now.., it should be clear that the chicken has broken 
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